Recent literature asserts that board size is one of the crucial determinants in board monitoring. We conjecture optimal board size leads to effective and efficient decision-making. Using a U.S. firm sample from year 1996 to 2005, we examine whether board size has any impact on one of the main tasks of board monitoring -appropriate compensation for CEOs. Specifically, we investigate if board size is associated with CEOs' pay-performance sensitivity. Agency theory suggests top managers' compensation be structured in alignment with shareholder wealth. If a board is vigilant, managers who create (destroy) wealth should be rewarded (penalized). By using value added models, we construct a new sensitivity measure of CEO compensation to wealth added per share. Our findings indicate that there is a non-linear relationship between board size and CEO pay-performance sensitivity. As the board size becomes bigger, the pay-performance sensitivity follows a pattern that first increases and then decreases.
Introduction
One of the most important tasks of corporate boards is to select, evaluate, and approve appropriate compensation for the company's executive officers. The infamous compensation packages received by former NYSE chairman, Richard Grasso, and former CEO and Chairman of Fannie Mae, Franklin Raines, draw criticism on the insensitivity of the boards over CEO compensation. Under both cases, the compensation packages were approved by the board. While boards of directors are the designated monitor of shareholders, oftentimes they seem to be too slow to react if they act at all. Further, according to a recent survey conducted by the Corporate Library, the average annual pay of CEOs at S&P 500 companies increased from $8. (also known as "say-on-pay" bill) distracts boards and discourages top executives from serving on public companies, the attempt indicates some inclination of policy-makers to indirectly return some authority which is traditionally designated to the board of directors to shareholders. The goal of this proposed say-on-pay bill is similar to what has already been adopted in the United Kingdom, Australia, and Sweden. The change in legislation"s attitude suggests policy-makers do not often believe boards can do an adequate task in aligning incentives of top managers with shareholders through compensation. Hence the proposal exerts pressure on boards to be more efficient and effective in aligning top management compensation packages with shareholder wealth. By September, many large U.S. companies, such as Blockbuster Inc. and Verizon, have voluntarily voted on and approved some forms of "say-on-pay" giving shareholders some power to determine top executive compensation.
2 Nevertheless, with the departure of Stan O"Neal at Merrill Lynch and Charles Prince at Citigroup, attention is brought back on the shrinking pool of top talents in the industry. Reich (2007) argues that CEOs are not overpaid because of the ever increasing challenge to operate in a highly competitive market place. Vigilant and well-functioning boards are now facing insurmountable pressure to identify and recruit talents while designing a competitive compensation that is sensitive to the market"s supply and demand of talents. Coupled with the increasing external pressure, board monitoring is often challenged with top management"s incentives. Agency theory suggests that there is an inherent problem when top managers are hired for their expertise to manage a company on behalf of shareholders. Jensen and Murphy (1990) argue that there is a conflict of interest between shareholders of a publicly owned corporation and the corporation"s management. The separation of ownership and control gives top managers opportunity to accumulate private benefits at the expense of shareholder wealth. In theory and practice, compensation policy can be designed to provide managers incentive to select and implement actions that increase shareholder wealth. Jensen and Murphy further propose that compensation policy that ties top managers" welfare to shareholder wealth helps align the private and social costs and benefits of alternative actions; hence provide the right incentives for management to take appropriate actions. Based on this argument, it is appropriate to pay top managers on the basis of shareholder wealth. In their sample from 1974 to 1986, Jensen and Murphy find that CEO wealth changes $3.25 whenever the value of the firm changes by $1,000.
It has been widely accepted that board size affects firm performance. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) believe most corporate boards are dysfunctional and that this problem worsens as the number of directors increases. Thus they suggest limiting the number of directors to ten. Jensen (1993) proposes an optimal board size to be eight or nine arguing that a larger board tends to be less effective in making decision. Yermack (1996) echoes this assertion and provides empirical evidence to support that that smaller boards are associated with higher firm value. He also finds that companies with smaller boards exhibit favorable financial ratios, and provide stronger CEO performance incentives from compensation and the threat of dismissal. Mak and Kusnadi (2005) examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the firm value (proxied by Tobin"s Q) of Singapore and Malaysia firms. Consistent with Yermack"s findings, they find that there is an inverse relationship between board size and firm value in both countries. Dalton, Daily, Johnson, and Ellstrand (1999) , on the contrary, argue that one of the main functions of board is to provide counsel for management at critical corporate events. Their findings provide support that larger boards are better counsel for management. However, Raheja (2005) argues that optimal board size and composition are a function of directors" and firm"s characteristics. Raheja suggests that optimal board size is a result of a tradeoff between maximizing inside directors" incentive to reveal private information and outside directors" cost of coordination and ability to reject inferior projects.
While boards have the authority to decide on how top managers are compensated, little is known on what makes a board more efficient in coming up with the right compensation decision. This paper attempts to examine how size of board as one of the determinants in board imposes corrective actions on executive compensation relative to firm performance. Specifically, we investigate the relation between board size and CEO"s pay-performance sensitivity to better our understanding on two aspects: incentive and monitoring. Board of directors is charged with the fiduciary duty to provide incentives for CEO to maximize shareholders" wealth and penalize those that fail to do so. Information flow and process could be a crucial key to understand how board size might affect decision-makings especially when it comes to one of the most important duties of boards. We conjecture that if a board is optimal in size, the cost of coordinating and sharing of information is low, leading to a high sensitivity in corrective actions on executive pay in response to firm performance. Our findings suggest that there is a non-linear relationship between board size and CEO pay-performance sensitivity, after controlling for board structure, CEO"s attributes and firm characteristics. And the non-liner pattern between board size and CEO payperformance sensitivity proves robust to a variety of robustness tests. However, we note that our study does not identify one "optimal size" for boards in evaluating CEO"s pay based on firm performance.
We test the relation between board size and firm"s CEO pay-performance sensitivity to understand the effectiveness and efficiency of incentive and monitoring provided by boards in reducing agency problem. We review literature in Section 1, present data and research methodology in Section 2, discuss our empirical findings in Section 3, offer some robustness tests in Section 4, and conclude in Section 5.
Data and Methodology 2.1 Data and Sample Selection
We examine U. We restrict our analysis to only CEO"s compensation for two reasons. First, CEOs are the most important and influential decision makers in corporations, and often the highest paid manager in a public firm. Second, since compensation is reported for the five highest paid executives in ExecuComp, the identity of those individuals varies year-by-year (Dass, Massa and Peyer, 2005) . Hence, we believe CEO compensation is a fair proxy for top executive pay.
Variables Description
Compensation data are classified into seven compensation categories identified in the Summary Compensation Tables of the proxy statements. They are salary, bonus, other annual compensation (including perquisites and amounts for reimbursed for payment of taxes), restricted stock awards, options or stocks appreciation rights (SARs), long-term incentive plan payouts (LTIP), and "all other compensation". Three measures of compensation are used in this study: current compensation including salary and bonus (TCC), total compensation including options granted (TDC1) and total compensation including options exercised (TDC2).
We define CEO pay-performance sensitivity as the change in CEO compensation (as measured by the three compensation measures) divided by the change in firm"s market value added (MVA) per share. While market value of a firm"s common equity is calculated by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding 4 , MVA is defined as the difference between the total market value of a firm and the book value as indicated on the balance sheet. From a valuebased management perspective, the total value of any firm is the market value added (MVA) to common shareholders plus the book value of common stocks, preferred stock, and debts. With all things equal, the higher a firm"s MVA, the better the job management is doing for the firm"s shareholders. We use the value added model to examine shareholder wealth change is because boards of directors often look at MVA when deciding on the compensation a firm"s managers deserve.
5 Also, by explicitly accounting for stock price and value, we are able to test both incentive and monitoring provided by the board to the top manager. For incentive, we examine the effectiveness of boards in aligning CEO compensation in response to the magnitude of shareholder wealth changes. For monitoring, we examine the efficiency of boards in refining CEO compensation in response to the timing of shareholder wealth changes (i.e. "elasticity" of CEO pay in relation to firm performance). In addition, we factor into per share"s MVA to provide a one-toone comparison between individual CEO pay and the value change of a share. The following equation defines our CEO pay-performance sensitivity measure:
where ∆CEO(COMP) is defined as the change of CEO compensation from period t-1 to period t, while the ∆(MVA) is defined as the change of firm"s market value added for each outstanding common share for the corresponding period.
Our main investigative variable is board size, which is measured as the number of directors on board as of the annual meeting date during each fiscal year. We also control other variables related to board structures, CEO attributes, and firm characteristics. Board structure includes outside director to total director ratio, whether the firm has a dual title for CEO/chairman, number of board meetings, and total director ownership. CEO attributes include CEO age, tenure, ownership and number of other directorships. Firm characteristics include firm sales, return on assets (ROA), long-term debt ratio, capital expenditure to asset ratio. Because the compensation committee is responsible for reviewing and approving, on behalf of the board of directors, the amounts and types of compensation to be paid to company's executive officers, we single out compensation committee and report it separately. The variables that we include are the ratio of outside to total director on compensation committee, and a dummy variable indicating whether CEO is also served on compensation committee.
[Insert Table 1 in means. Combining these statistics for the three sensitivity measures, we believe that at least half of our firm-year sample is rewarding CEO when value added to shareholder wealth however for the other half there could be over-rewarding or over-penalizing CEO in terms of compensation. The average board size is 9.70 members with an average number of 6.39 independent directors on the board. Eighty one percent of our firm-year sample has a dual title structure in which CEO is also the chairman of the board. On average, firms have 7.40 meetings during a fiscal year and directors own 14.75% of firms" shares. Average CEO in our sample is 56.01 years old, serves on board for more than ten years, owns 5.82% of company"s shares and serves on no more than one outside board. Average sales are around $5,285.80 millions, with a ROA ratio of 0.13, a long-term debt ratio of 0.20 and a capital expenditure ratio of 0.06. The total number of directors on compensation committee is 3.62 members, with more than ninety percent on that committee being outside director. Finally over half of the time CEO serves on the compensation committee.
Research Methodologies
We estimate multivariate regressions to test the relation between board size and CEO payperformance sensitivity. In our basic empirical model we employ ordinary-least-square (OLS) regression method to regress CEO pay-performance sensitivity on variables that measure the size of the board along with other control variables: (2) where PPS is the CEO pay-performance sensitivity measure as defined in equation (1). BSize is the investigative variable defined as the log of the board size; while the squared item of BSize is included to test whether there is a non-linear relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and board size. BoardStructure indicates outside director to total director ratio, CEO duality, log of number of board meetings and office director ownership. CEOAttributes includes log of CEO age, log of CEO tenure, CEO ownership and number of other directorship. FirmCharacteristics is a vector of performance control variables such as log of firm"s sales, firm"s return on assets, long-term debt to asset ratio, and capital expenditure to asset ratio. The coefficients 1  and 2  in equation (2) jointly measures the change in the CEO pay-performance sensitivity in corresponding to board size, controlling for other control variables.
Follow Boone et al. (2007) , we use two strategies to control for the fact that board size and CEO pay-performance sensitivity can be endogenous in the board"s decision making process. First, we include industry and year fixed effects in our regressions. The rationale for industry and year fixed effects is that they control for the underlying economic environment that might jointly determine board size and CEO pay-performance sensitivity. For example, firms in the same industry face similar production technologies and market conditions -the very things that give rise to the endogeneity problem in the first place. In these tests, we classify all sample firms into nine industry groupings according to their standard industrial classification (SIC) codes and use dummy variables indicating whether each firm belongs to one of the nine industry groupings. We also use ten year dummy variables to test year fixed effects. And finally we use the two-way fixed effect model to control for both industry and year fixed effects. The basic OLS regression results are not substantially affected when we employ these fixed effect models on our panel data.
Our second strategy to control for endogeneity is to introduce instrumental variables for board size and the CEO pay-performance sensitivity. We pick these variables' lagged values as the instrumental variables. For example, for firm j's observation in year 2005, the instrumental variables for board size and CEO payperformance sensitivity are firm j's board size and CEO pay-performance sensitivity in year 2004. We employ two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression method, including instrumental variables in the tests for the relation between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and board size. It turns out, however, that including these instruments, or additional instruments for other variables that plausibly could be endogenous, does not affect our main results substantially.
Empirical Results
We expect a significant relation between board size and CEO pay-performance sensitivity. That is, CEO pay-performance will be more sensitive in firms with more optimal board size compared to that of firms with a suboptimal board size. Table 2 provides results on simple OLS regressions using our main independent variables. In Panel A of Table 2 we regress the pay-performance sensitivity measures on log of board size. As indicated in the table, all the pay-performance sensitivity measures are significantly negatively related to board size, indicating that smaller boards are more efficient in forming good compensation plans for CEOs. While in Panel B we add a squared log board size measure into the regressions, the results have changed dramatically. The coefficients of log board size measures in all regressions have become positive, while the coefficients of the squared terms are all negative. The positive coefficients associated with log board size and the negative coefficients associated with the squared log board size terms clearly tell us that there exists a non-linear relationship between board size and CEO pay-performance sensitivity. For smaller boards, adding more board members will help the board make more appropriate compensation decisions based on firm performance; while as the board size reaches beyond the optimal level, additional board members will be detrimental for boards to make efficient compensation decisions as related to firm performance.
[Insert Table 2 here]
While Yermack (1996) argues that board size is inversely related to firm performance, he also suggests that board size could be non-linearly related to firm performance. The findings in Table 2 indicate that board size has a non-linear relation with CEO"s pay-performance sensitivity. Thus, we argue that boards will become more and more sensitive to CEO"s compensation plan until they increase to a certain size. Once the optimal size is met, boards become less sensitive to CEO"s pay-performance. This could be the case when boards grow beyond their optimal size, information is not executed as efficiently and effectively, thus leading to slow decision-making process. In Figure 1 , we present a graphical depiction of the relation between board size and one of the measures of our CEO"s pay-performance sensitivity (PPStcc) to illustrate our argument. As indicated in Figure 1 , PPStcc peaks when board size is around eight or nine. This finding is consistent with the conventional wisdoms (see Jensen (1993) , Lipton and Lorsch (1995) , Monks and Minow (1995) and Yermack (1996) ) about the optimal board size. Table 3 gives results on our full regression model for the pay-performance sensitivity measures. The results are fairly similar to our simple regressions in Table 2 in that board size is a non-linear function related to CEO"s pay-performance sensitivity. We find that board size is significantly positively related to while the squared term of board size is significantly negatively related to all measures of CEO payperformance sensitivity. We also find that the CEO pay-performance sensitivity measures are significantly positively related to CEO stock ownership. The finding indicates that boards can better align CEOs" pay with their performance when CEOs" own interest is more aligned with shareholder"s wealth.
[Insert Figure 1 here]

[Insert Table 3 here]
Raheja (2005) conjectures that board size could be dictated by the industry that the company is in. In our first strategy to control for endogeneity, we test both industry and year fixed effects. We add SIC dummies in our regressions and the results are reported in Tables 4, we add year dummies in our regressions and the results are reported in Table 5 , and then we include both groups of dummies and test fixed two-way effects and report results in Table 6 . In Table 4 , we run the model by including all the SIC dummies except dummy SIC6 (financial industry). Our main results hold, i.e. the non-linear relationship between board size and CEO pay-performance sensitivity still exists. And the positive relationship between CEO stock ownership and pay-performance sensitivity holds in two out of the three specifications. The insignificant coefficients on all the SIC dummies indicate that when comparing to financial firms, other industries is no more or less "responsive" to CEO pay-performance sensitivity.
[Insert Tables 4 here]
We also incorporate the year dummies into our model to capture the time specific effect that is invariant. The results of the estimations of a fixed effect model with year dummy variables are reported in Table 5 . Year 2005 is the based year, therefore the other year dummy variables show the difference from year 2005. Again, our main results hold with the inclusion of year dummy variables. There is no consistent pattern for the year dummies. Finally in Table 6 , both SIC dummies and year dummies are included in all the regressions to verify that the nonlinear relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and board size holds, controlling for invariant industry and year factors. And again the non-linear relation holds after considering two-way fixed effects.
[Insert Table 5 & 6 here]
Our second strategy to control for endogeneity is to introduce instrumental variables for board size and the CEO pay-performance sensitivity. Specifically two-stage least squares regressions are used to control for possible endogeneity between board size and CEO pay-performance sensitivity. In Table 7 , the results from the second-stage regressions are reported. The independent variables listed in this table include the fitted variables for Log(Board Size)(f) and [log(Board Size)] 2 (f). To find each of the fitted variables, the non-fitted variable is regressed against its instrumental variables and the common control variables in the first-stage regressions. Among all the other common explanatory variables include Lag(PPS): one-year lagged measure of the three payperformance sensitivity measures. The results from the two-stage least squares regressions suggest that the non-linear relation between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and board size holds.
[Insert Table 7 here]
Robustness Tests
Board size can be positively related to firm size, and large firms usually have bigger boards. In order to verify that the relationship between CEO payperformance sensitivity and board size is not just capturing the relationship between the sensitivity measures and firm size, we stratify our sample into ten size deciles according to market value of equity and run the basic OLS regressions. Each year the firms in the sample are ranked into 10 different size deciles according to firms" market value of equity. For example, decile one includes the smallest firms and decile ten includes the biggest firms. Every year the rank is re-balanced according to that year firm"s market value of equity so that decile one always contains the smallest firms and decile ten always contains the biggest firms. The regression results are reported in Table 8 . In Panel A of Table 8 we regress the pay-performance sensitivity measures on log of board size, while in Panel B we regress the payperformance sensitivity measures on log of board size and the squared log board size measure. Only the result in decile 8 shows that there is a non-linear relationship between pay sensitivity measures and board size, while this relationship is not significant in any of the rest groups. Had the non-linear relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and board size is just a misrepresentation of firm size effect, we would have seen significant positive coefficients for small deciles and significant negative coefficients for big deciles. The results in Table 8 clearly indicate that the non-linear relationship between CEO payperformance sensitivity and board size is not just representing the firm size effect.
[Insert Table 8 here]
In Table 9 , compensation committee variables are included in the regressions. The purpose is to test what difference it makes for the relation between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and board size when we control for the compensation committee composition. The coefficients of independent director ratio on compensation committee are both positive and significant in all three regressions, suggesting that CEO pay-performance sensitivity is positively related to outside directors serving on compensation committee. The non-linear relationship between payperformance sensitivity and board size still holds after controlling for compensation committee variables.
[Insert Table 9 here]
Compensation is not going to be set and paid on the last day of the year. However, we are measuring the stock price change from beginning of year to end of year as part of our MVA calculation. It is likely that compensation is going to be set during the year, well before the end of the year. For the above reason, another robustness test is performed. We re-calculate CEO pay-performance sensitivity measures so that CEO compensation is associated with the firm"s previous year"s stock performance. Basically our main results hold when we regress the recalculated sensitivity measures on board size. 
Conclusion
We examine a model of organization in which all the dimensions of the firm"s governance structure, CEO attributes, board structure and firm characteristics, etc., act jointly as a value maximizing package. We identify board size as the main feature to better our understanding on how size affects the effectiveness and efficiency of corporate boards in decision-making process. On one hand, while the firm sometimes holds all other organizational features fixed, it occasionally alters one particular structure of board in which agency conflicts prevail and firm value decreases. On the other hand, the firm might well have anticipated this possibility by creating a complete package of incentive mechanisms that address deficiencies in other areas. For example, the firm will choose CEO pay-performance sensitivity or other monitoring mechanisms to offset problems that might arise from the suboptimal size of board. The firm will choose such monitoring mechanisms if the benefits of doing so exceed the costs. Furthermore, the firm may find that the costs of suboptimal board size are worth bearing if the benefits are great enough. In this firm, exogenous or predetermined variables, such as regulatory status, growth opportunities, nature of the product markets, etc., determine the optimal combination of governance features.
Similar to Keys and Li (2005) argument, we believe performance is endogenously related to organizational structure. Thus, one might not expect to observe a relation between performance and a governance device. However, it is reasonable to justify our experiment, given that board has the designated authority to decide and monitor CEO pay. If certain sizes of board are more often associated with better CEO pay-performance sensitivity, we argue that firms that move fast and persuasively will alter their board sizes leading to shareholder expectations of better future performance.
In this study, our findings provide insight on why some firms" CEO compensations are more in alignment with shareholder wealth compared to those of others. While current literature is inconclusive on board size and its impact on corporate governance, we keep board size static and examine its "usage" in determining CEO"s compensation.
7 Our empirical finding indicates a non-linear relation between board size and CEO"s pay-performance sensitivity. Smaller boards are often exhibited more sensitivity toward CEO"s compensation until board size reaches to a certain number. Our graphic presentation of such relation indicates CEO"s pay-performance sensitivity peaks when a board has eight to nine members. The finding is consistent with what is proposed by Jensen (1993), suggested by Monks and Minow (1995) and Yermack (1996 This table provides coefficient estimates and p-values from multivariate regression on CEO pay-performance sensitivity specifications. PPStcc (in thousands) represents pay-performance sensitivity using current compensation including salary and bonus to represent CEO compensation divided by MVA per share, PPStdc1 (in thousands) represents pay-performance sensitivity using total compensation including options granted to represent CEO compensation divided by MVA per share, and PPStdc2 (in thousands) represents payperformance sensitivity using total compensation including options exercised to represent CEO compensation divided by MVA per share. Board Size is the number of directors on board. Outsider ratio is Outsiders divided by Board Size. CEO Duality takes the value of one when the CEO is also the chairman of the board and zero otherwise. Meetings is the number of meetings the board has during the year. Directors Ownership (in percentage) is the percentage of directors" stock ownership. For CEO attributes, CEO Age is the age of the Chief Executive Officer, CEO Tenure is the number of years CEO serves the company, CEO Ownership (in percentage) is the percentage of CEO"s stock ownership, and CEO outside Directorships is the number of directorships CEO holds in addition to his own company"s board. For firm specifics, Sales (in millions) is the total sales of the company, ROA is the return on assets of the firm, Long-term Debt ratio is the company"s long-term debt divided by total assets, and Capital Expenditure is the company"s capital expenditure divided by total assets. Nine out of ten year dummies are included in the regression to capture the fixed year effect. This table provides coefficient estimates and p-values from multivariate regression on CEO pay-performance sensitivity specifications. PPStcc (in thousands) represents pay-performance sensitivity using current compensation including salary and bonus to represent CEO compensation divided by MVA per share, PPStdc1 (in thousands) represents pay-performance sensitivity using total compensation including options granted to represent CEO compensation divided by MVA per share, and PPStdc2 (in thousands) represents payperformance sensitivity using total compensation including options exercised to represent CEO compensation divided by MVA per share. Board Size is the number of directors on board. Outsider ratio is Outsiders divided by Board Size. CEO Duality takes the value of one when the CEO is also the chairman of the board and zero otherwise. Meetings is the number of meetings the board has during the year. Directors Ownership (in percentage) is the percentage of directors" stock ownership. For CEO attributes, CEO Age is the age of the Chief Executive Officer, CEO Tenure is the number of years CEO serves the company, CEO Ownership (in percentage) is the percentage of CEO"s stock ownership, and CEO outside Directorships is the number of directorships CEO holds in additional to his own company"s board. For firm specifics, Sales (in millions) is the total sales of the company, ROA is the return on assets of the firm, Long-term Debt ratio is the company"s long-term debt divided by total assets, and Capital Expenditure is the company"s capital expenditure divided by total assets. Eight SIC dummies and nine year dummies are included in the regression to capture the two-way fixed effect. P-values are provided in parentheses. The sample is stratified according to market value of equity. Each year the firms in the sample are ranked into 10 different size deciles according to firms" market value of equity. For example, decile one includes the smallest firms and decile ten includes the biggest firms. Every year the rank is re-balanced according to that year firm"s market value of equity so that decile one always contains the smallest firms and decile ten always contains the biggest firms. This table provides coefficient estimates and p-values from regressions of CEO pay-performance sensitivity on board size within each size decile. PPStcc (in thousands) represents pay-performance sensitivity using current compensation including salary and bonus to represent CEO compensation divided by MVA per share, PPStdc1 (in thousands) represents pay-performance sensitivity using total compensation including options granted to represent CEO compensation divided by MVA per share and PPStdc2 (in thousands) represents payperformance sensitivity using total compensation including options exercised to represent CEO compensation divided by MVA per share. Log(Board Size) is the log of the number of directors on board. P-values are provided in parentheses. Intercepts are suppressed. The sample is stratified according to market value of equity. Each year the firms in the sample are ranked into 10 different size deciles according to firms" market value of equity. For example, decile one includes the smallest firms and decile ten includes the biggest firms. Every year the rank is re-balanced according to that year firm"s market value of equity so that decile one always contains the smallest firms and decile ten always contains the biggest firms. This table provides coefficient estimates and p-values from regressions of CEO pay-performance sensitivity on two independent variables, Log(Board Size) and [Log(Board Size)] 2 within each size decile. PPStcc (in thousands) represents pay-performance sensitivity using current compensation including salary and bonus to represent CEO compensation divided by MVA per share, PPStdc1 (in thousands) represents payperformance sensitivity using total compensation including options granted to represent CEO compensation divided by MVA per share, and PPStdc2 (in thousands) represents pay-performance sensitivity using total compensation including options exercised to represent CEO compensation divided by MVA per share. Log(Board Size) is the log of the number of directors on board. [Log (Board Size)] 2 is the square of the log of the number of directors on board. P-values are provided in parentheses. Intercepts are suppressed. 
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